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ABSTRACT
This thesis contains a discussion of the estimate of the situation as
a decision-making process. The author provides a background on the
estimate of the situation as a process and in individual, group, and
organizational decisin-i making, A. Information-piocessihg moidei iot
an organization demonstrates the need for a match between informa-
tion-processing requirements and capabilities. Information-processing
requirements include factors from technology, inter-unit dependence,
and the environment. Information capabilities consist of unit structure
and integrating mechanisms. As the information-processing require-
ments approach a high level of uncertainty, the capabilities must
match. The appropriate decision-making procedure to use varies with
the cha.ige in uncertainty. The estimate of the situation procedure
works well in highly uncertain situations but is very time intensive.
Alternate methods can accommodate reduced uncertainty or reduced
time available. Evaluations of staffs may not consider the context or
situation in which the staff operates. The situational factors incorpo-
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Success in military operations depends on many factors, including
the ability to respond appropriately in a given situation. Determining an
effective response is a result of analyzing the situation and deciding on
an appropriate course of action. The procedure developed by the United
States Army for this purpose is the estimate of the situation.
A difficulty in situation estimation is understanding the state of all
variables in the environment. Uncertainty in warfare is the norm. As
stated by Clausewitz, the renowned 19th-century military philosopher,
... the great uncertainty of all data in War is a peculiar difficulty,
because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere
twilight, which in addition not unfrequently- like the effect of a fog
or moonshine- giv, s to things exaggerated dimensions and an
unnatural appearance. [Ref. 1: p. 1891
Uncertainty is a major consideration when de-igning and evaluating
organizations. Effective organizations develop methods to reduce the
uncertainty which exists in a given situation. The estimate of the situa-
tion is one decision-making strategy which enables decision making to
occur when uncertainty exists.
The estimate of the situation process is a time-consuming planning
method which can be used by military staffs. The time available for an
operation may not permit a complete estimate. Additionally, in cases
where the situation is very certain, the estimate process may not be
needed. Staffs can use simpler, less time-consuming processes. The
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appropriate decision-making process depends on the situation which the
staff faces.
Many variables occur in a situation which causes uncertainty. An
analysis of the situational factors can help determine the amount of
information processing required to reduce uncertainty. Once these
requirements are understood, the organization can design its processing
capabilities to match the needs.
The situational variables should be considered when evaluating a
staff involved in situation estimation. Two similar organizations operat:ng
with different amounts of uncertainty and available preparation time
should not necessarily operate the same way. An evaluation of the staffs
could consider the situational factors in order to provide the most accu-
rate assessment of each staffs decision-making ability.
Different levels of decision making exist in an organization. Individ-
uals make decisions. Groups or staffs are composed of individuals who
collectively make decisions. Organizations or units are composed of
groups which interact with each other and their environment while mak-
ing decisions. All levels of decision making contribute to the effectiveness
of an unit.
B. SCOPE
The first portion of this thesis provides background on decision
making and the different levels of decision making in an organization.
Chapter II explains the current problems which exist with the estimate of
the situation and introduces the concepts of military decision making.
The role of the individual as a decision maker is discussed in Chapter Ill.
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In Chapter IV, groups are defined and the ways groups can organize to
make decisions are considered. Chapter V describes organizational con-
cerns and how uncertainty affects the whole structure of an organization.
A model for information processing in an organization is also presented
in Chapter V.
The remaining chapters incorporate the concepts discussed in the
first five chapters into the model for information processing and evalua-
tion presented in Chapter V. In Chapter VI, the model is api A to
understanding a situation in a military context. Situational factors are
shown to require certain organizational structures and decision-making
methods to allow a staff to effectively make decisions. Chapter VII pre-
sents a technique to use when evaluating staff processes. The importance
of incorporating situational factors in an evaluation is discussed. Chap-
ter VIII provides a summary and concluding remarks.
3
H. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. MISMATCH BETWEEN DOCTRINE AND EXECUTION
The estimate of the situation is the procedure used by the Army to
analyze a problem and to develop a solution to the problem. One would
expect that schools would teach what is to be used. Army doctrine states
explicitly how the estimate is to be done, but actual practice shows units
ignoring or making incomplete estimates. [Ref. 2:p. 31
The basic concept of the estimate is to consider the facts about the
current situation and make recommendations on courses of action to be
taken. Several courses of action are to be developed and the attributes
and shortcomings of each are to be specified. The procedure is taught at
various levels in the Army education system, and all officers and many
senior noncommissioned officers learn it as the method for staff
planning.
Studies have shown that in exercises, staffs do not follow the pre-
scribed doctrinal format. Usually, only one course of action is developed.
Often, when more options are considered, the first option is heavily
weighted and the others are only used to meet the requirement to have
more courses of action. Observations from the Battle Command Training
Program (BCTP) show this [Ref. 2:p. 31. BCTP is a program to train divi-
sion and corps staffs in command post exercises driven by computer
simulations.
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To understand the process a commander and staff must execute, a
model is useful. Several models of a decision process exist. For the pur-
poses of this study, two different military decision-making models are
discussed: the command decision process and the military decision-
making procedure.
B. COMMAND DECISION PROCESS
The command decision process is a model of the sequence of events
followed by a commander in confronting a decision. This model is used
as a method to list the steps a Naval Battle Group Commander uses to
react to a situation [Ref. 3:p. 421. The process is also useful in discussing
what a commander in the Army does. Levels from company command
through Army command must follow the steps in varying degrees of
depth.
1. Recognition
Recognition of an event which requires action is the initiating
step in a decision process. The recognition may come from direct obser-
vation of an environmental stimulus, such as an enemy's action. Alter-
natively, the impetus may come from a higher headquarters' directive.
Regardless of the source, the decision process is started by the recogni-
tion that some action must be taken.
2. Command Determination
Once an event requiring action is recognized, the person who
must act is designated and notified. The commander may decide the
action requires response from certain of his subordinates. The
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subordinate is advised to be prepared to respond- the advice possibly
received as a warning order.
The appropriate response and subordinate may be determined
by standard operating procedures (SOP). Even if dictated by SOP, this
step warrants careful consideration because no situation will be antici-
pated completely.
3. Definition
After notifying the responsible commander, the decision maker
must further define the situation by clarifying and developing the course
of action. The clarification may be as simple as determining that the unit
must execute preplanned orders. Alternatively, a full-fledged operation
order may have to be developed, to include developing several possible
courses of action.
4. Decision and Authorization
With several courses of action to pursue, the decision maker
will decide which to use and will authorize the appropriate action to
subordinates. The courses of action will define the options available. The
commander may decide not to take any action or may take one of the
given options. If the commander has the proper authority, he will author-
ize the chosen option and the process will proceed. If he does not have
the authority, the commander will request approval while simultaneously
proceeding.
5. Preparation
Once the general course of action is defined, the appropriate
functional areas can plan accordingly. The commander's staff acts as a
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decision aid to the commander in planning the mission. The various staff
officers in their various functional areas will plan for the approved course
of action. If a preplanned order is executed, this step may already have
been completed. If previously completed, the staff will review the plan-
ning to ensure that no changes are necessary.
6. Command
With preparation complete, subordinate units are notified
regarding their responsibility. The command step includes the notifica-
tion of the units involved. The subordinate unit may have to execute its
own iteration of the Recognition through Preparation steps.
7. Conduct and Direction
After the various iterations of the action selection process are
conducted, the persons who conduct the action direct the appropriate
responses. As the action occurs, the information obtained is fed back to
the appropriate command level. If all parts of the plan are executed as
directed, the objective is obtained. If not, the command will begin the
command decision process again and decide whether another course of
action is appropriate. The process will continue until all parts are suc-
cessfully completed.
C. MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Other models of decision making include the military decision-
making process [Ref. 4:p. 5-6] and troop-leading procedures [Ref. 5:pp.
2-6 through 2-15]. The troop-leading procedures incorporate the military
decision-making process as part of the decision sequence. The actions
associated with the troop-leading procedures are directly applicable at
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battalion level and below, whereas the military decision-making process
applies to ai;y level with a staff. For the purposes of this work, the mili-
tary decision-making process is most applicable.
1. Mission Received
The mission is either assigned by a higher headquarters or is
determined by the decision maker. This step initiates the process. With a
mission, the unit must take action to accomplish it and begins planning.
2. Information to Commander/Staff
The commander/decision maker and his staff receive all perti-
nent information on the mission. Information ahbi,,t t"e mission is
obtained from the higher headquarters plan. Other information is
obtained about the situation from intelligence sources and friendly unit
data.
3. Mission Analysis
The mission analysis is the process used to develop an under-
standing of the mission. The mission is determined from higher head-
quarters' directives and the commander gives his restated version of the
mission. The staff aids the commander in ascertaining the tasks that
must be performed. The most important task is obtaining an under-
standing of the purpose to be achieved through completing the assigned
tasks. The staff must also help in deciding any constraints on the unit.
4. Staff Estimates
With the commander's planning guidance, the staff members
works in their functional areas to develop estimates of the situation. The
staff works as a decision aid for the commander, recommending courses
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of action and listing the advantages and disadvantages of each. Each of
the staff members must coordinate his functional area with that of the
others.
5. Commander's Estimate
After receiving the staff estimates, the commander gives his esti-
mate, which results in a decision and the commander's concept. During
this step, the commander analyzes the courses of action previously
determined by the staff. Based on his personal experience and the staff
input, the commander will either choose one of the staffs courses of
qction choose a course and modify it, or use a new course. The com-
mander completes this step by deciding on a course of action and giving
his concept.
6. Preparation of Plans/Orders
Once the commander has stated his concept of the operation.
the staff members again work in their functional areas to produce a plan
to execute the mission. The commander's concept should have given
enough information so that the staff can complete its part of the plan
without further guidance. Plans are written to ensure that staff and sub-
ordinates understand the mission. Fragmentary orders may be issued
later to modify orders as the situation changes.
7. Approval of Plans/Orders
The completed plans are reviewed by the commander. If the
staff has understood the commander concept correctly and the situation
has not changed, the commander will approve the plan. If there are no
changes. the plan is disseminated.
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8. Issuance of Plans/Orders
The appropriate units are issued the plan. The commander may
have a formal briefing, with each staff officer briefing on his part of the
plan. Alternately, the commander may issue written orders and distrib-
ute the orders to the units. The commander may also choose to use a
combination of the methods.
9. Supervision
After the proper orders are issued, the mission is executed and
the role of the commander is to supervise. In supervising, changes to the
plan may be determined. This feedback may drive a whole new planning
process. The decision-making process may recycle several times. The
changes may require only small modifications to the plan, distributed in
an fragmentary order. Supervision of the execution is continued until the
mission is accomplished.
10. Mission Accomplishment
The final step indicates the accomplishment of the mission. If
all the tasks in the mission are accomplished, the process is completed.
If not, or if the situation has changed, the process is repeated.
Two questions arise in discussing situational estimation. The
first question is: What information does the commander need to evaluate
a situation? How the information is obtained is also a concern. The sec-
ond question stems from the requirement to have multiple options. The
value of multiple options in obtaining a better decision is widely





Information is essential for a decision maker. This information
may be divided into categories. While many different categories are possi-
ble, for this work the categories will be as follows: [Ref. 3:pp. 53-551
" Tactical Data- specific information about the status of units (both
friendly and enemy), to include strength, location, and missions.
" Background Data- information obtained from reference documents,
strategic intelligence collection, enemy tactics and capabilities, and
friendly force capabilities. This information does not change rapidly.
• Interpretation- evaluations and recommendations from staff, based
on their experience, perception of background data, and other
information.
• Coordination- information obtained from adjacent or subordinate
units or allied sources. This would include adjacent or subordinate
commanders' intentions, capabilities, and missions.
" Doctrine- how the commander is expected to fight. This information
includes what is taught in schools and the commander's experience.
* Analysis- information that needs evaluation, such as the time
required to move a certain-sized unit a required distance.
2. Information Needed
The information needed by the commander is obtained from a
variety of sources [Ref. 3:pp. 53-551. These sources include the following:
* Communication Equipment- information is acquired through moni-
toring radios, data links, and telephone systems.
* Personnel- information received from ir mediate staff and d rectly
subordinate commanders.
* Documents- operation orders, reference manuals on friendly and
enemy capabilities.
* Sensors- strategic as well as tactical collection devices.
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* Decision Aids- current or future decision aids can fuse raw data and
present the data as usable information.
* Personal Knowledge- the commander can gain knowledge from
direct observation or his own personal experience.
The information received by the commander is processed to
decide the appropriate course of action. The staff acts as a decision aid to
help organize and evaluate. The estimate of the situation procedure is
used to organize the information and present logical responses.
E. MULTIPLE OPTIONS
The concept of producing multiple options for an operation is com-
monly accepted as the correct procedure. Considering available alterna-
tives and picking one is intuitively appealing. However, rational thinking
requires that empirical data be considered to validate the need for more
than one course of action.
An experiment using teams of military officers playing a war game
on the JANUS simulation tested the hypothesis that a plan with multiple
options or alternatives is superior to a single option plan. The measures
of effectiveness consisted of two components: (1) the result of the war
game, and (2) the process used to achieve the outcome. The outcomes
were evaluated based on movement and attrition data collected from the
results of the simulation. The process data consisted of frequency counts
of information exchanges and requests and counts of numbers of orders.
In addition, subjective ratings of the quality of performance were derived
using the subjective workload evaluation assessment tool. [Ref. 6:pp. i-ii]
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The conclusion drawn from this experiment was that the headquar-
ters using a multiple option plan were more effective. The results indi-
cated that the headquarters were most effective when a multiple-option
plan was used and the battle workload was low. A similar conclusion
about multiple options was not confirmed in the high-battle workload
condition. [Ref. 6:pp. i-ii]
The results of the multiple-option experiment support the use of the
estimate of the s!tuation process. The process taught by the Army calls
for the use of multiple options. These multiple options aid the comman-
der in making a decision.
F. THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
The estimate of the situation is designed to be a guide to aid in plan-
ning military operations. This procedure is one step in the larger military
decision-making process discussed previously. The estimate pr)cess is
taught to help in developing thought patterns for staff officers and
commanders.
The intent is to present logical and detailed system that, if used
repetitively, will be internalized and thus will facilitate rigorous plan-
ning and flexible execution during combat operations. [Ref. 7 :p. iJ
1. Origin
The estimate of the situation was first writ-en in the 1909 pub-
lication of Captain Roger S. Fitch's Estimating Tactical Situation's arid
Publishing Field Orders. in 1910, FiLClI't ezumate of the situation was
published in the Army's Field Service Regulations. The doctrine gave a
procedure which began with mission receipt. considered relevant factors.
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and chose the best course of action to complete the given mission. Once
the course of action was selected, orders were written to execute it. [Ref.
8:p. 141
2. Current Usage
The estimate process is described to students at the Command
and General Staff College as a system to develop a thought pattern. The
techniques taught are placed in a logical sequence to develop courses of
action, ultimately arriving at a decision [Ref. 9:p. i]. The intent is to use
the process repetitively in a classroom environment so that in a stressful
combat situation the estimate process is automatic.
The command estimate is a version of the estimate of the situa-
tion which builds on the classic "estimate of the situation" defined in
FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. The command estimate
(referred t hereafter as the estimate or the estimate of the situation)
emphasizes the information needed by the commander and his staff to
quickly plan and respond. Each staff section (personnel, logistics, intelli-
gence, operations, etc.) conducts its own estimate process. The steps of
the military decision-making process are included the command esti-
mate. The differences between the two estimate procedures are shown in
Table 1 [Ref. 9:p. 1-21. The estimate procedure is a way for planners to
quickly analyze information and develop responses.
To be effective, the estimate must be a rapid mental process
which allows the commander to act more quickly than his enemy [Ref.
10:p. 221. The purpose in having a process to evaluate and respond to a
14
TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF THE COMMAND ESTIMATE AND THE ESTIMATE
OF THE SITUATION






Development of Courses of Action The Situation and Courses ofAction
Analysis of Courses of Action Analysis of Courses of Action andComparison of Courses of Action
Decision
Actions and Orders Decision (Recommendation)
Supervision
situation is to organize a method which everyone can use. If each indi-
vidual commander and staff confronted with a decision develops his own
method, some will have faster, more effective methods than others. The
goal of the process is to develop a course of action which will defeat an
enemy.
The estimate process works well for long-range planning. where
time is not critical. The estimate process is admittedly a very thorough
and time-consuming procedure [Ref. 9:p. 6- 11. ST 100-9, the Student Text
for the Command Estimate, describes both the complete estimate and an
abbreviated version which has only the most critical elements.
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The critical elements are: mission, situation/develop courses of
action, analyze courses of action, comparison, decision, and execution.
The restated mission is derived from the missions of commanders, both
one and two levels higher, and includes both planning guidance and
intent. A graphic situation depicting probable enemy courses of action
aids in developing friendly courses of action. The friendly courses of
action are analyzed by war gaming to identify advantages and disadvan-
tages. The identified advantages and disadvantages are compared to
determine the one most likely to succeed. The commander decides which
course of action is best and gives his guidance to execute the plan. [Ref.
9:pp. 6-1 through 6-21
3. Alternative Model
An alternative model for time-critical situations was proposed
by Major W. Edward Shirron. Searching for a time-efficient but thorough
method, Shirron used the factors of mission, enemy, terrain (and
weather), troops, and time available (METrl-T). METT-T is an easy-to-
remember acronym which covers all the needed considerations for a
planner. Normally applied at a tactical level, the factors can be used at
any level. [Ref. 8:pp. 85-891
a. Mission
The commander first considers the mission or intent. He
must understand what he is expected to accomplish. His requirements




The enemy capabilities and expected actions, both present
and future, are critical to the commander. The commander must con-
sider what actions the enemy is expected to take. By anticipating the
enemy's moves, appropriate counter-actions are planned.
c. Terrain and Weather
Terrain and weather conditions are evaluated from both
friendly and enemy perspectives. A quick assessment of any effect these
elements will have on the unit's mission is made. The time to move a
certain-sized unit through a given area is determined.
d. Troops
The troops available to the friendly commander will drive
his ability to execute a mission. The ability to concentrate firepower at
decisive points is often crucial to success. Concentration of firepower
depends on both mobility and the logistical resources available.
e. Time
The amount of time available is often crucial. The com-
mander must assess time in terms of both enemy and friendly forces. To
win, he must use time better than the enemy.
The criticality of time is a recurring theme in decision-
making models. A difficulty arises in determining how much time is truly
available. The available time often is dictated in an order, but the true
available time is dependent on the actions of an enemy.
The problem of time criticality illustrates a shortcoming In
the decisicn-making processes. The definition of the total environment in
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which a decision maker or commander operates is not always clear. The
uncertainties of the enemy, time, terrain and weather, and even the
friendly situation require further investigation of the entire decision-
making environment.
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I. DECISION MAKING BY INDIVIDUALS
Decision making by an individual is the basic element in a study of
the process of situation estimation. In a typical staff estimate, many indi-
viduals make decisions. The process each of these individuals goes
through in making his particular decision affects the result of the proce-
dure. The quality of each individual decision contributes to the overall
effectiveness of the staff.
A. EFFECTIVE DECISION MAKING
An effective decision maker is one who makes decisions which ena-
ble accomplishment of organizational goals. If a group or organization
accomplishes its mission or goals, then effective decisions are made. How
the effective decision maker works needs to be examined.
Different explanations of how an effective decision maker uses avail-
able information exist. Nickerson and Fecher describe effective decision
makers as ones who are able to organize large amounts of information
and quickly extract pertinent data. Goldin and Hayes-Roth contend that
effective decision makers adopt strategies which elaborate available infor-
mation to a finer level of detail than those by less-effective decision
makers. The critical difference between the two definitions is whether a
decision maker quickly completes effective decisions or uses a more time-
consuming, detailed analysis. [Ref. 11 :p. 161
Both explanations of decision makers' methods described above may
be correct. If, as Dreyfus argues, the mental processes which form the
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decision-making process change based on experience, then both defini-
tions may be appropriate at different learning stages for a decision maker
[Ref. 1 1:p. 16]. The common thread is that information is understood and
used to create results. Two decision makers may operate using com-
pletely different methods and achieve equally effective results.
Strategies used in problem solving depend in large part on the sub-
ject's knowledge base for the task to be solved. An expert not only has
more knowledge but his knowledge may be more interconnected. Each
piece of knc ,ledge may be known as related to other pieces of knowl-
edge, creating interconnections. An expert does not necessarily think fur-
ther ahead, have a better memory, or examine more options. Using his
highly interconnected knowledge base, the expert may recognize the
appropriate response based on multiple inputs. [Ref. 1 1:p. 16]
B. COGNITIVE STRATEGIES
Cognitive strategies used by decision makers vary. A cognitive strat-
egy is the mental process to develop a response in a situation. Different
people may use a different strategy in a similar situation.
1. Recognitional Decision Making
Recognitional decision making involves retrieving information
from experience about past situations which are similar. An experienced
decision maker may recognize cues which key him to react in a way he
knows will work. This reaction is not just a blind response. The decision
maker considers potential problems, and if none are significant, he will
implement his solution. [Ref. 12:pp. 58-641
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Studies by Klein show that decision makers may not even real-
ize a decision is made. They react under instinct. Flein studied urban fire
commanders and wildland fireground commanders. Klein interviewed
one commander who said he did not make any decisions. The comman-
der meant he did not develop multiple solutions and analyze each to find
the best one. The commander actually did make decisions continuously.
Klein found in his research that, in studying over 150 experienced deci-
sion makers in situation assessment, the recognitional approach is typi-
cal of those with many years of experience. [Ref. 12:p. 58]
The strengths of the recognitional decision-making strategy
include the ease of application and intuitive appeal. It does not call for
calculations and research to create multiple solutions. The decision
maker can analyze the situation and compare it to similar past experi-
ences, using the relevant parts to respond. People tend to be comfortable
with judgments based on personal experience. [Ref. 13:p. 121
Recognitional decision making also has weaknesses. Experience
may not apply. Rarely will a decision maker foresee every possible situa-
tion. Almost any situation, as it develops, will have slight differences
which require changes to the solution.
The success of the recognitional decision-making approach
relies on the ability to distinguish things that apply to the present prob-
lem from those merely similar. Almost any combat situation will have
similarities with another, but the similarity seen may not matter in the
current problem. If a decision maker is unable to distinguish the critical
cues, he is not likely to succeed using this approach. [Ref. 13:p. 13]
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2. Schema Theory
Schema theory, a variant of recognitional decision making,
assumes information processing for situation assessment happens by
comparing an observed situation with memory reference models for dif-
ferent situation types and matching the one that has the most factors in
common with what is observed. Schemas are memory structures used for
information processing. A person can use his experience to recognize and
analyze a new situation. From this analysis. proper decisions are made.
A model of information processing proposed by Noble allows the flexibility
to have inexact matches between observed and previous situations [Ref.
14:p. 4].
Data are developed for later recall and are stored in a network of
schema [Ref. 14:pp. 5-13]. Each cf 4he schemas in the network (see Fig-
ure 11 [Ref. 14 :p. 71 consists of three layers: slot, criteria, and inference
and action. The layers are related to steps in a decision-making mecha-
nism.
The slot layer is the problem formulation step. The criteria layer
relates to problem analysis. Alternative selection is represented in the
inference and action layer. The slot layer specifies slots or positions
which aid in identifying features of a given situation. The physical and
functional assets of possible situations are specified in each slot. A
schema for an armored battle might contain a slot for many tanks and
an additional slot for multiple axes of advance.
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The feature assessment layer includes criteria curves and
weighting rules. The curves convert viewed data, such as combat vehicle
numbers and distances, into usable information, such as "many tanks"
or formation types. Weights can also be assigned to specific features
according to their relative importance. For example, the location of engi-
neer vehicles may weigh heavily in identifying the main attack.
The inference and action layer describes the responses and con-
clusions to be made with appropriate situations. The actions result from
a table look-up with a particular input. The action may be to reinforce
artillery in a certain sector.
To summarize the schema process, consider the identification of
an enemy attack. Using the slot layer, vehicles are identified as different
combat vehicles in a specific formation. In the criteria layer, the numbers
and types of vehicles and their separation distances are converted to usa-
ble information, such as enemy motorized rifle regiment in a hasty attack
formation. Different explanations for the formations can be weighed
against each other in the criteria layer. For example, whether the attack
is a motorized rifle regiment or an armored regiment can be considered.
In the final layer, inference and action, the decision to counterattack or
defend is made. Additional factors, such as fire artillery at a reference
point, can also be decided.
A person using a schema may use a model which incorporates
information-processing steps. Information is processed and referred to
data that is obtained through training. The steps relate to the different




















* Step 1- Initial selection of schema. A situation or task will cause a
particular schema to be chosen.
* Step 2- Object classification. Familiar objects seen are classified as
specific items. For example, an observer viewing a satellite picture of
vehicle movement would distinguish tanks from extraneous vehicles.
* Step 3-Assessment of feature relevance and functional substitu-
tion. In this step, the objects identified in step 2 are examined,
including the relationships between objects. Relevant features are
converted into standard physical units, such as type of vehicle and
unit formations.
" Step 4- Feature assessment. The physical units are translated into
specific assessment scores for each schema. For example, engineer
bridging equipment will weigh heavily for locating a main attack.
This step and steps 5 and 6 use the data stored in the criteria layer.
" Step 5- Feature weighting. In this step, the scored features are
assigned the weight determined by the schema weight assignment
rule.
* Step 6- Feature combining. Assessed and scored features are com-
bined using a weighting scheme (e.g, a geometric mean).
" Step 7- Iteration of 5 and 6 at higher levels. In step 7, the different
features assessed in the situation are combined and analyzed. For
example, ground attack, air attack, and radio traffic can be com-
bined to produce a complete assesse pnt nf b- ,tf1l
3. Analysis of Problem-Specific Information
A second cognitive strategy (given that schema theory is a vari-
ant of recognitional decision making) is to analyze the specific informa-
tion for the problem. In this strategy, future conditions are determined
analytically from the observed situation. For example, an enemy unit
observed moving at a certain rate and direction can be used to calculate
arrival times at specific locations. [Ref. 13:pp. 15-161
The strength of the analysis of problem-specific information is
that assumptions from which conclusions are drawn can be made
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external and explicit. One does not have to rely on memory. In addition.
conclusions can be independently verified by someone other than the
main decision maker.
A weakness of this strategy includes the probability of not hav-
ing all Information because the other side may try to conceal or deceive.
Also, the relative effectiveness of different analytical procedures varies.
An analytical procedure may be highly reliable, but if it is based on poor
assumptions it will not provide accurate results. For example, if a unit is
moving along a specific route but later changes to an alternate route, the
expected arrival location may be changed. Another weakness is that the
ability to apply a procedure depends on the ability to detect what is
important. If several related conditions are critical to the situation and
only portions are observed, critical information may be missed.
4. Mental Simulation
Mental simulation is a third cognitive strategy. Future condi-
tions can be projected by determining all conditions where a particular
action would happen. Simulating mentally, by stepping through the
action and accounting for all the movement, required resources, and
various side effects, the future state can be hypothesized. Additionally.
the strategy provides a method to test future plans. [Ref. 13:pp. 17-19]
A strength of this strategy is that it encourages identifying con-
ditions, effects, side effects, and other conditions that a decision maker
might otherwise overlook. In addition, the decision maker must make
assumptions and expectations plain. These assumptions and expecta-
tions are exposed to scrutiny, possibly identifying any mistakes.
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One weaknesses of mental simulation is that the validity of a
conclusion depends on the quality of simulation. Assessing the quality of
simulation is tough, especially in terms of its accuracy and com-
pleteness. The ability of people to conduct quality mental simulation is
questionable. More complex tasks make simulation increasingly difficult.
The simulation strategy effect may cause overconfidence by the user, A
believable simulation based on false assumption or false procedure may
cause a false conclusion. [Ref. 13:pp. 17-191
C. DECOMPOSITION
Decomposition of tasks is a method to compensate for weaknesses
in cognitive strategies. Breaking the problem into smaller pieces allows
each piece to be analyzed more easily. The pieces are separately analyzed
and then analyzed as a whole. [Ref. 15:pp. 6-7]
A commander's staff works with tasks decomposed into functional
areas. The typical division into operations, intelligence. logistics, and
personnel areas is made because missions are too large for one area. By
separating into separate staff areas, each section can concentrate on its
particular part of the problem. Within the military decision-making pro-
cess, the staff members coordinate in tasks which overlap in function to
complete the plan.
D. COGNITIVE BIAS
Cognitive biases are systematic discrepancies between a correct
answer and a judged answer. The biases show intellectual limits, and
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overcoming them improves the quality of the thought process. [Ref.
16:pp. 226-2771 One common cognitive bias is the confirmation bias.
A confirmation bias occur when a decision maker fails to change a
decision or recommendation despite receiving new, conflicting informa-
tion. Decision makers generally have a tendency to stick with the initial
estimate. If conflicting data are received, the data may be interpreted to
confirm the original hypothesis or be completely ignored.
An experiment to investigate the confirmation bias in a military con-
text was conducted using Army intelligence analysts [Ref. 17:pp. i-24].
The analysts were given a realistic battlefield scenario and asked to
decide on the most likely enemy avenue of approach. They subsequently
were given updated intelligence reports which included some information
which confirmed and other information which contradicted previous
reports. The analysts were asked to reconsider their decisions and rate
each piece of information as to whether it supported or contradicted their
individual hypothesis. Confirming evidence was weighted more heavily
than contradictory. Contradictory information was recognized but given a
low or neutral weight. The analysts appeared to have picked a course of
action based on the early information and then explained new informa-
tion in terms of the original course of action.
A second experiment w. _h a similar situation and group was con-
ducted. The participants this time were given a description of typical
decision biases and graphic aids to assist in analyzing the uncertainties.
[Ref. 18:p. ii] The results of this second experiment showed the analysts
became more sensitive to new data and less influenced by their initial
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estimates. The analysts were less likely to over-weigh confirming evi-
dence, but this tendency was not eliminated.
The indication from these experiments is that, to reduce confirma-
tion biases, training is helpful. The simple explanation about the ten-
dency to have a confirmation bias had an effect. If decision makers are
trained with this concept, it may help reduce the bias. (Ref. 18:pp. 29-321
E. COGNITIVE STYLE
Cognitive style is the consistent method an individual uses in per-
ception and intellectual functioning. Cognitive style differs from cognitive
strategy in that the style is an attempt to define an individual's way of
functioning as opposed to defining methods individuals can use. Addi-
tionally, cognitive style is more dependent on perception. [Ref. 19:p. 11]
Little evidence exists to show there is any effect of cognitive style on
the quality of a decision [Ref. 19:p. 11]. The same decision can be
reached by different people using different strategies. A decision maker or
analyst will gain more by considering the strategy in making a decision
than by considering the style. The purpose of mentioning cognitive style
in this paper is to eliminate it as a way to model decisions.
The individual decision-making strategies discussed in this section
are used by staff officers and commanders in the estimate process. Many
use the different processes without realizing that they are using a deci-
sion strategy. Understanding individual, group, and organizational pro-
cesses will help Improve decision quality.
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IV. GROUP DECISION MAKING
A. DEFINITION AND TYPES OF GROUPS
Groups and their behavior play an important role in the estimate of
the situation. Each staff section involved in making an estimate com-
prises a group. The processes that affect the staff section affect the out-
come of the estimate.
1. Definition
Many different definitions of a group exist. These definitions are
usually related to a researcher's particular area of study. For the pur-
poses of this study, the following definition will be used:
A collection of two or more individuals who are interdependent and
interact with one another for the purpose of performing to attain a
common goal or objective. [Ref. 20:p. 1821
This definition includes the need for common goals, interaction,
and performance, all which are necessary in a study of an organization.
Groups are distinguished from crowds at a movie or other collections of
people. Different types of groups can exist.
2. Types of Groups
Various methods exist to distinguish different types of groups.
The groups prevalent in an organization are: functional, task or project.
and interest or friendship. Groups can also be classified as formal or
informal. Formal groups are those whose main purpose is attaining
organizational goals. Informal groups are formed naturally by member
interaction and do not necessarily have any relationship with the
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organization's mission [Ref. 20:pp. 183-1841. Each of these groups can
and often does exist in a commander's staff.
Functional groups are those established by the organizational
structure. Designated staff sections are the usual formal groups on a
military staff. Within a staff section, more groups may exist. For example,
the operations staff may be divided into plans, operations, and training.
Task or project groups are groups established on an ad hoc
basis. If a particular project involves coordination between various action
officers, a task group may be created by the commander or his desig-
nated representative. If an unique mission is given which involves only a
part of the unit, a special task group may be formed. For example, a
division-sized unit may form an advance party with representatives from
various staff sections. The advance party precedes the division on a
deployment and functions as the divisional staff, a group, until the main
body of the division arrives.
Interest or friendship groups are informal groups developed on
a basis of a common interest, belief, or characteristic. For example,
groups of officers with common backgrounds or acquaintances from pre-
vious assignments may become informal groups. The informal group may
create contacts which would not occur in the normal decision-making
process. For instance, an officer in the operations staff may have past
experience on a logistics staff and have friends in the logistics section.
Through his friends, the operations officer might informally offer his
thoughts as input to the logistics estimate.
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3. Group Structure
All groups will have a structure which includes in some form
the following: members, differentiation of parts, communication, rules,
and regulations. The membership in the group may or may not be strictly
defined. The different roles or positions of group members must have
unique characteristics. These positions may be permanent or may be in
transition. The group members will communicate in some form. The fre-
quency of communication may vary from seldom to continuous. Individ-
uals in the group must follow some system of rules to enable the group to
operate. In a military group, the leader or commander often holds the
power which enforces regulation. [Ref. 21:p. 149]
4. Why Groups Form
Groups form for two major reasons: goal attainment and/or
satisfaction of personal needs. Goal attainment is the reason groups are
designated in an organization. As personal needs arise, they may cause
other groups to form. [Ref. 20:pp. 195-1961
A primary purpose of formal groups in an organization is
accomplishment of tasks or goals. The operations staff is organized to aid
the commander in planning and conducting operations. Other staff sec-
tions also exist to accomplish their particular functions. [Ref. 20:p. 1951
The purpose of a short-term task force or a committee is formal
problem solving. This need may be met by formal groups on a recurring
basis. Short-term groups are used for specific, one-time problems. [Ref.
20:p. 195]
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Groups may form because of proximity and attraction [Ref.
20:p. 1951. Operations and intelligence staff officers may group together
to solve problems because their tasks are interrelated. Similarly, a task
or mission may need the input of different project officers from different
staff sections.
To meet individual needs, groups may form for socio-psycholog-
ical reasons [Ref. 20:p. 195]. Particularly in a combat situation, different
staff sections may organize together for safety and security. Furthermore,
groups may form socially because of common interests.
Groups may form for reasons other than those previously dis-
cussed, but the ones already mentioned are the primary causes. Most
military staffs are formed based on authorization documents. Anyone
developing documents must consider the tasks the groups must
accomplish.
4. Role of Task
The specific tasks that confront groups should drive the design
of the group. The group's task drives the need for information and, con-
sequently, the communication methods used. Each task will have unique
characteristics. These can be broken into three categories: generation,
choosing, and negotiating. [Ref. 22:p. 600]
A group that generates ideas is involved in planning tasks and
creativity tasks. Planning tasks involve the development of plans. Cre-
ativity tasks involve generation of new ideas. A group involved in devel-
opment and creativity tasks needs to organize to allow members of the
group to input ideas and quickly evaluate them. Procedures and facilities
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can be established to improve performance. For example, standard meth-
nd to -ormplete a rmutine plan can Lnprove effectiveness. Facility aids,
such as a blackboard on which to record ideas generated, will aid in task
completion. [Ref. 22:pp. 600-601]
Choosing alternatives includes intellective and preference skills.
Intellective skills are used to select the correct alternative. Selecting an
alternative with no objective measure of effectiveness is a preference skill.
War-gaming alternatives is an example of this task in the estimate of the
situation process. A staff that is involved in choosing alternatives can
establish standard procedures to war-game different courses of action.
By making procedures routine, the output of the staff improves. [Ref.
22:p. 6011
Cognitive-conflict and mixed-motive tasks are used in negotiat-
ing solutions. Cognitive-conflict tasks involve settling conflicts in points
of view. Mixed-motive tasks are those used in resolving differences in
conflicting motives or interests. In a staff structure, these tasks can be
resolved by the commander or his chief of staff. Resolving differences is a
reason to establish a group commander or leader. [Ref. 22:p. 6011
Staffs encounter each of the various types of tasks. The staff
may organize itself differently to handle each of these tasks most effec-
tively. How well a staff organizes affects its effectiveness.
E. GROUP EFFECTIVENESS
Various factors help or detract from the effectiveness of a group. A
group's effectiveness is defined as the success of the group in achieving
its goals or meeting the needs of its members. The factors that contribute
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to the group's effectiveness include the members, the organization and
its past performance. and the environment. !Ref. 21 F. 1531
1. Group Members
A group is only as strong as its members. Despite the form of
the group's structure, individuals must make and implement group deci-
sions. If individuals in the group do not execute their parts of a task, or
do so poorly, the overall group task performance will suffer. Furthermore,
the loss of a key person in the group can adversely affect the group's per-
formance. For example, if the person lost was a leader with superb orga-
nizing and executing skills, the group will perform at a lower level until
the loss is replaced or overcome. [Ref. 21 :p. 1531
2. Group Organization and Performance
A group's effectiveness is influenced by how the group is orga-
nized and its past performance. The organization of the group compared
to its task or mission and the appropriateness of the type of leadership
used will enhance or detract from the effectiveness. The past perfor-
mance of the group will influence the morale and current capabilities,
which will also have an impact on the group's effectiveness. (Ref. 21 :p.
1531
The size of a group and the proximity of its members influence
the design of the group. A small group whose members are located near
each other may work well in a conference room. A large, dispersed group
could not. Some form of electronic conferencing device (a radio, if nothing
else) is more appropriate for the larger, dispersed group. [Ref. 22:p. 5981
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3. Environmental Conditions
The environrent in which a group e st' affect the effec-
tiveness of the group. The environment includes not only the physical
elements (e.g., weather and terrain) but also other groups in the organi-
zation. Each of these will affect the group. [Ref. 21:p. 153]
The group resources must suit the conditions of the physical
environment. A staff must have facilities appropriate for work in the par-
ticular external conditions in which they are assigned. For instance,
combat conditions will create security Lequirements which must be met
to allow the staff to continue operations. The staff may have to plan for a
variety of conditions. Successful staff preparations will assist in a
successful operation. [Ref. 2l:p. 1531
Intergroup relations affect the effectiveness of all the groups
involved. The performance of a lower-level staff will depend, in part, on
the quality of the higher-level staff which directs the mission. Coordina-
tion between staff sections is also crucial for success. Competition
between staff sections may encourage quality performance, but if not
controlled it may adversely affect results. [Ref. 21:p. 153]
C. DEFICIENCIES IN GROUP PERFORMANCE
Deficiencies in the performance of a group will adversely affect its
ability to accomplish a mission. The deficiencies may result from interac-
tion in the ,,roup or from the group's design. Systmic deficiencies may
be examined to avoid problems. Specific group deficiencies include
group-think, social loafing, and various barriers to decision making.
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1. Group-Think
Group-Thi-k Is Cicei, u~ U to refei to a tendency for close-
knit groups to become unanimous in outlook. This condition may result
from seemingly positive aspects of group interaction, such as group
cohesiveness. The goal of group cohesion is paramount to decision
making. However, with a highly cohesive group, members may be reluc-
tant to disagree on an issue and violate the cohesive relationships in the
group. Other members of a group may pressure a disagreeing member
into conforming. [Ref. 23 :p. 12]
A group may overestimate its power and morality. By believing
the group is invulnerable, the members may become overly optimistic
and take extreme risks. Also, believing the group is fundamentally moral,
the ethical or moral consequences of a decision may be overlooked. [Ref.
24:pp. 10-15]
A closed-minded outlook can cause symptoms of group-think.
Rationalization by the group of information that conflicts with its own
view may prevent logical consideration of alternatives. Classifying other
groups or other group leaders as not being in conformance with its own
views may negate proper interaction. [Ref. 23:p. 12]
2. Social Loafing
Social loafing refers to the phenomenon of individuals perform-
ing at a lower level in a group than when they act individually. Experi-
ments tested the ability of groups of people to pull on a rope. Each
member of the group was also tested individually. Results showed that
individuals exerted less pull in a group. Individuals seem particularly
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prone to social loafing when their individual effort in the overall group
effort cannot be identified. [Ref. 2 5 :pp. 36-381
Experiments involving the performance of swimmers measured
their times in individual races versus their time as part of a relay team.
The relay times, although for the same distance, were consistently faster.
The result was attributed to the identifiability of each swimmer's contri-
bution to the relay. Also, at each lap turn teammates shouted times.
Hearing their teammates reinforced the idea that other members of the
team depend on each person. [Ref. 25:pp. 36-381
3. Barriers to Proper Decision Making
Decijinn making in a group or team creates problems in situa-
tion assessment and process management. Klein, in his study of team
decision making in command and control organizations, has identified
seven barriers to effective decision making [Ref. 26:pp. 242-24o]. These
barriers inhibit optimal effectiveness.
One barrier is that the key decision maker or commander in a
group may have a distorted perception of the situation caused by having
to rely on reports of others. A modem battlefield in which a commander
has a full view of his entire unit is rare, if not inconceivable. The com-
mander must rely on reports made by subordinates or other sources to
determine the current situation. An individual may report what he
believes to be true. For some cases, this is actually just a misperception.
Compounded misperceptions can cause a decision based on erroneous
information. [Ref. 26:p. 2421
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Transferring situation assessment from one shift to the next, as
a rcsult of ,ttaltiple bhifts in a command post or group, can cause prob-
lems. This is the second barrier.
If a relief shift receives an inadequate or confusing shift-change
briefing, the efforts of the new shift can be misdirected. Complete
updates are essential. [Ref. 26:p. 2421
A third barrier is the communication of goals in terms of the
commander's intent. In the operation order, the staff must clearly com-
municate the goals of the commander. Misunderstanding by subordi-
nates can result in the commander's mission not being performed. [Ref.
26:p. 242]
Undirected attention is the fourth barrier. Staff sections or
groups whose actions are closely related do not always respond identi-
cally to similar events. For example, the intelligence section may assign
key assets to concentrate on specific enemy actions, while the operations
section may need the same assets to be allocated differently. [Ref. 26:p.
2421
Missing expectation is the fifth barrier. Any situation assess-
ment is based on assumptions or expectations. Checking these expecta-
tions is often overlooked because no one is assigned the responsibility to
check for violations of the assumptions. [Ref. 26:p. 242]
The sixth barrier is the lack of improvisation, caused by the
inability to visualize the end result when the plan's original assumptions
begin to fail. A plan rarely remains unchanged from start to finish. When
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the plan is no longer feasible, success can be gained by improvising. [Ref.
26:p. 2431
The final barrier is the high failure of synchronization in an
operation. Synchronizing the various elements of the combined arms
force so that force is maximized at the critical point and time is difficult.
Not synchronizing can result in failure. [Ref. 2 6:p. 243]
These barriers can be overcome. Effective staffs can devise ways
to correct deficiencies. If they do not correct their problems, the staffs will
not be effective.
D. CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES
Correction of deficiencies is a prime concern in groups. Prior knowl-
edge of potential problems can aid in prevention. Organizing to avoid
problems may aid in group performance. Systemic problems, such as
group-think, can be avoided by prior planning. Studying how effective
groups perform may provide insight into how to have similar results.
Techniques in group planning can improve performance, as can organiz-
ing ideas into a structured format. Decision support systems are a
technology-aided way to compensate for deficiencies.
1. Ways to Avoid Group-Think
The symptoms of group-think can be avoided by careful plan-
ning. Different ways to organize a group are helpful. Examples include:
dividing policy groups into subgroups, inviting outside experts to
observe, and using a devil's advocate. Techniques of doing tasks also
may aid in preventing group-think. Techniques such as developing alter-
native scenarios and holding a second meeting to allow further
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contemplation of the issues can reduce the tLendency to group-think. [Ref.
24:pp. 10-171
Dividing policy-making groups into subgroups allows them to
work on the same issue separately. The subgroups can each indepen-
dently determine a solution, each under its own leader. The results of
these separate groups will probably differ somewhat, allowing a better
evaluation with more options. [Ref. 23:p. 151
Outside experts who are not part of the group should be asked
to evaluate the decisions. An outside expert can provide an objective view
on the quality of the decision. An objective assessment by a trusted indi-
vidual can improve gioup performance. [Ref. 24:pp. 10-171
One member of the group should be assigned the role of devil's
advocate. Considering the negative effect of any decision may avoid over-
sights. Errors or omissions can be determined. [Ref. 23:p. 151
When the decision making involves a rival or enemy organiza-
tion, alternative scenarios should be developed. A decision by the group
may hinge upon an estimated enemy situation. Depending on how the
enemy acts, the original course of action may or may not be appropriate.
The alternative scenario will allow the group to provide continuity of
action. [Ref. 23:p. 151
After an initial group consensus is reached, the group should
hold a second meeting where additional input is solicited. A second meet-
ing may not be possible in a time-constrained environment, but if it is
possible, the meeting may be useful. After additional thought. members
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will have a chance to voice lingering doubts or doubts that arose from
new information. [Ref. 24:pp. 10-17]
2. Effective Versus Ineffective Groups
The way in which effective groups interact, versus the way in
which ineffective groups interact, can account for differences in the qual-
ity of group decisions. For example, internal communication is a key
ingredient in any group process. In a study of groups of college students
maKing the same decisions, several characteristics were found to distin-
guish effective from ineffective groups. The decisions made were deter-
mined effective or ineffective based on an independent judgment by
experts in the subject of the decision. [Ref. 27:pp. 363-369]
The quality of a group's decision may stem from the manner in
which the group examined opinions and the assumptions advanced by
group members. Effective groups made less assumptions and carefully
scrutinized those few made. Ineffective groups tended to gloss over opin-
ions and assumptions without considering their validity. [Ref. 27:pp.
376-377)
The manner in which the groups evaluated choices may have
affected the decision quality. Both types of groups developed alternatives
and evaluated the choices by pre-established criteria. However, the effec-
tive groups carefully tested each choice against the pre-established crite-
ria. They considered the consequences of the various recommendations.
Ineffective groups appeared to "go through the motions" IRef. 27:p. 371)
when deciding which course of action to choose.
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The quality of a group's decision may be affected by the nature
of premises which served as a basis for the group's decisions. Effective
groups appeared to decide based on presented facts and logical assump-
tions. Assumptions used by ineffective groups sometimes appeared ques-
tionable. The ineffective groups' assumptions did not correlate with the
facts of a situation. [Ref. 27:pp. 378-379]
The nature of influence of the most influential members of
group can affect the quality of the decision. The effective groups had
members who supplied a positive influence. The dominant members
helped guide their groups to effective decisions by asking appropriate
questions, noting important information, and avoiding digressions. The
ineffective groups had members who tended to exert a negative or restric-
tive influence. Making erroneous assumptions, misinterpreting informa-
tion, and leading the group on tangents were some of the mistakes made
by ineffective groups. [Ref. 27:p. 3791
The four propositions presented are useful in improving a
group's performance. The members of the group can avoid the pitfalls of
the groups in the study. Avoiding others' mistakes can improve planning
and other tasks the group performs.
3. Planning as a Group Activity
Planning with a group is advanced by applying three points.
First, workers should be direct participants in the planning process.
Workers are more comfortable with the plan if they are allowed to to help
develop it. Second, the planning should be a continuous process. As sit-
uations change, the plan should change. Third. planning should be
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conducted so that all units at the same level can plan simultaneously
and interdependently. Simultaneous planning will encourage communi-
cation, which will improve coordination. [Ref. 28:p. 257]
4. Idea Structuring
Organizing ideas into a structured manner can greatly improve
the effectiveness of the group. A group with such a technique has a
method to follow and will not have to spend time deciding how to pro-
ceed. Various techniques are available and include the estimate of the
situation process. Two others are presented as examples.
a. PERT/CPM
Project Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) and Critical
Path Method (CPM) are two project-scheduling techniques developed
independently in the late 1950s [Ref. 29:p. 4]. Both PERT and CPM
involve the concept of identifying all tasks and task interactions in a proj-
ect. The tasks are ordered in the sequence in which they must be exe-
cuted. Tasks that can be completed simultaneously are identified. The
entire project is analyzed to determine whether effort can be realigned to
optimize time, money, and manpower spent. The effect of a delay in one
task on the whole project can be shown by both PERT and CPM.
b. Consensus Mapping
Consensus mapping is a technique used to aid in idea gen-
eration. A group working on a particular problem generates a list of ideas
and conducts a preliminary evaluation of the ideas. The ideas are placed
into clusters and categories. If possible, different subgroups are used to
create more concepts. Next, members of the group try to identify
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organizing frameworks for the various idea clusters. Each of the pro-
posed frameworks is evaluated and a consensus determined. This pro-
cess can involve multiple refining steps in determining clusters and the
overall framework. When completed, the consensus framework has
helped identify the key dimensions of the overall problem. [Ref. 30:pp.
587-591]
5. Group Decision Support Systems
A group decision support system (GDSS) can combine tech-
niques from communication, computing, and decision support technol-
ogy to help a group of people formulate and solve problems. Aids can be
as simple as a checklist of possible courses of action to prevent neglect-
ing an option. They can be as complex as a distributed teleconferencing
system with computer-assisted analysis. [Ref. 31:pp. 67-68]
Computers, with their ability to process large amounts of infor-
mation quickly, can improve time use. War-gaming potential courses of
action on a computer gives the commander a look at possible outcomes.
The courses of action can be altered slightly and the effect of the changes
can be seen. If properly designed, simulations can provide a reasonable,
descriptive view of a situation.
Decision aids are exactly that. They aid the decision maker but
do not replace the need for huimans in the process. Using aids to improve
human performance has great promise if applied wisely.
Groups play a critical part in a decision. However, groups are
part of organizations. The group must operate in an organization, and
the organization must properly align the groups to better its
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effectiveness. Groups can improve their own performance, but they may
rely on other groups for information, guidance, or support. If other
groups do not perform effectively, all the groups and the organization
may suffer.
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V. ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING
A. PURPOSE
Understanding the purpose of an organization is important in
determining how the organization works. Different descriptions of organi-
zational purpose are possible. A basic premise is that organizations must
process information because of the uncertainty which they face [Ref.
32:p. 614].
1. Uncertainty
Organizations are systems designed to deal with uncertainty.
The uncertainty for an organization is created when information is
needed but not known. Both internal and external causes of uncertainty
affect an organization. A critical task used in dealing with this uncer-
tainty is gathering information to approach a more certain state. [Ref.
32:p. 614]
2. Information-Processing Systems
Organizations can be described as information-processing sys-
tems. One of the main purposes of an organization's structure is to cre-
ate the best arrangement and interconnections for subunits to aid in the
collection, processing, and distribution of information [Ref. 32:p. 614].
The information gathered by a military staff varies from friendly unit sta-
tus on many factors to enemy status on similar factors.
Limited capacity is available to process information [Ref. 33:p.
5551. Regardless of the technical sophistication of a unit, information
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processing in the unit has a certain limit. This limit may be created by
human or technical reasons. Because of this limit, not all desired infor-
mation can necessarily be absorbed. Information priorities may have to
be established. The challenge is to have a structure which manages the
uncertainty and processes to the required limit.
Information processing by an organization is more than just
individual effort. Sharing of analysis by people is common. In an organi-
zation, decisions are often made by a group, so a consensus occurs.
Decisions made should reflect disagreements and include more than just
individual opinions. [Ref. 33:pp. 555-556]
Organization-level information processing is influenced by the
organization's division of labor. Organizations are divided into subgroups
or sections. For good performance, each of the various sections must do
well and coordinate effectively. [Ref. 33:p. 556]
3. Groups of Groups
Organizations can be seen as a group of groups or composed of
subunits. As mentioned before, various subunits specialize in specific
tasks. The subunits may be competing for the same scarce resources and
coordination between subunits is critical. The subunit structure must be
carefully aligned to deal with uncertainty. [Ref. 32:p. 6151
B. UNCERTAINTY, CAUSES, AND RESULTS
The causes and related efects of uncertainty are important factors
in determining the success of an organization. Uncertainty comes from
several sources. Subunits within the organization face uncertainty in
problem solving and coordination which is related to their different tasks.
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The environment, defined as the world outside the organization, is poten-
tially variable and unstable, which causes uncertainty. The uncertainty
from sources creates a need for information to overcome the uncertainty
and enable the organization to function.
1. Uncertainty Sources
As the subunits complete their tasks, they face uncertainty
from different sources. Uncertainty is the difference between what is
known and what is needed to complete the given task. Three factors
which jointly influence subunit uncertainty are task characteristics, task
environment, and task interdependence [Ref. 33:pp. 615-616]
Tasks vary in degree of uncertainty. The complexity of tasks and
subunit interdependence affect the amount of certainty or uncertainty
[Ref. 33:p. 615]. For example, an administrative staff with a routine garri-
son mission will face less-complex tasks than a combat headquarters. An
administrative staff will have fewer information-processing requirements
than a staff planning and conducting combat operations.
The environment of a task is usually seen as a source of uncer-
tainty. More information is needed proportionally as the operational envi-
ronment increases in uncertainty or becomes more dynamic [Ref. 33:p.
6161. In a stable environment, standard operating procedures (SOPs) are
applicable. If the environment is unstable, SOPs may not work.
Tasks that require a large amount of interdependence between
subunits call for a large amount of coordination. A subunit with an inde-
pendent task ia,,ay need little information from other subunits. The more
complex the interactions between subunits, the more complex the
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coordination effort [Ref. 33:p. 616]. The difficulties encountered in coordi-
nating joint (multi-service) operations in Grenada showed that inter-
actions are complex.
2. Result of Uncertainty
As work-related uncertainty increases, so does the need for
information and information-processing capability. A task low in uncer-
tainty will need little additional information, whereas a task with high
uncertainty may require much additional information. The uncertain sit-
uation will call for constantly updated information to allow adjustments
in plans. Additional information will require more processing capability
so use can be made of the information. [Ref. 33:p. 6161.
C. INFORMATION PROCESSING
Information processing is important to consider because organi-
zations are designed to process information. A basic purpose for orga-
nizations is to act as information-processing systems, as discussed
previously. A major reason to process information is to reduce uncer-
tainty in a situation. Filtering and pigeon-holing are factors that can
affect improper information processing. An organization's capacity for
information processing can control its effectiveness.
1. Uncertainty and Equivocality
Organizations process information to reduce uncertainty and
equivocality. Equivocality is similar to uncertainty but includes the pos-
sibility of multiple interpretations of the same information. Organizations
use information to clarify a situation and come to a consensus about how
to react. [Ref. 32:pp. 554-5551
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2. Filtering and Pigeon Holing
Organizational structure can cause excessive filtering and
pigeon-holing. Individuals may receive more information than they can
handle. Some pieces of information will get more emphasis than others.
An individual may attempt to emphasize particular information based on
what is assumed to be the correct interpretation. This emphasis, be it
intentional or not, will cause a filtering of incoming information. A second
effect is called "pigeon-holing." Pigeon-holing uses learned categories to
define incoming information into compartments. [Ref. 34:p. 126]
The effects of filtering and pigeon-holing can be reduced by
using the following: favored information channels, specialized vocabular-
ies, communication checkpoints, and standard operating procedures
[Ref. 34:p. 1261. kiavored information channels can emphasize particular
pieces of information as more important than others. Specialized vocabu-
laries can clarify uncertain information. Communication checkpoints cre-
ate additional checks on communication flow. Individual mistakes can be
lessened by strict adherence to standard operating procedures. These
four techniques will force information to be used as intended. Any filter-
ing or pigeon-holing which does occur will restrict information in the way
the organization desires and not by individual preference.
3. Information Capacity
Different organizational structures have different capacities for
effective information processing. Organizations are more effective when a
match exists between the information processing needed and the infor-
mation-processing capability of its structure. The primary components of
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organizations which affect information processing are the unit structure
and the integrating mechanisms between the subunits. [Ref. 33:pp. 617-
6191
The unit structure has a considerable effect on the ability to
process information. The relationship between unit structure and infor-
mation-processing capability is based on the degrees of organic or mech-
anistic factors in the structure. The terms "organic" and "mechanistic"
are based on four structural variables: formalization, specialization, cen-
tralization, and impersonality. "Formalization" refers to the extent that
rules, procedures, and instructions are made explicit. An organization
witb eyplcit stpndard operating procedures is highly formalized. "Spe-
cialization" is the amount that official responsibilities are spread among
several positions. A highly specialized organization is one that that has
many different divisions or sections. "Centralization" is the degree of con-
trol by an authority to make critical decisions. A single leader who must
approve all decisions has a centralized organization. "Impersonality" is
the proportion of interpersonal relations that are formal or restrained by
the unit. An organization whose personnel interact only in ways pre-
scribed by organizational protocol is highly impersonal. [Ref. 35:p. 6]
A mechanistic structure is high in formalization, low in special-
ization, high in centralization, and high in impersonality. An organic
structure tends to be the opposite of a mechanistic. An organic structure
is low in formalization, high in specialization, low in centralization, and
low in impersonality. The more organic an organization is. the greater is
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its information -processing capability. Figure 3 illustrates this relation-
ship between mechanistic and organic structures and the effect on
information-processing capabilities. [Ref. 3 5 :p. 61
The structures established to link subunits or integrating
mechanisms affects the information-processing capability of an organiza-
tion. Information-processing capability increases with the complexity of
the integrating structure. A mechanism using a standard operating pro-
cedure tends to be less complex. Planning using schedules is toward the
middle of the complexity scale. More complex structures involve feedback
to allow changes as a result of updated information. The integrating
mechanisms and their effect on information processing are shown in Fig-
ure 4. [Ref. 35:p. 61
D. INFORMATION-PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS
Information processing requirements can be organized into frame-
works to aid in analysis. The frameworks can identify the current state of
the organization, aiding the proper design. The frameworks are composed
of three factors which lead to uncertainty and equivocality. The factors
are technology, inter-unit relations, and the environment. [Ref. 3 3:pp.
563-5671
1. Technology
"Technology" is the knowledge, devices, and procedures used to
change input into organizational output. Task variety and task analyz-
ability are task characteristics which define the proper use of technology.




















transioi mation process. Task analyzability refers to the procedure used
to complete a task. The more analyzable a task is, the more workers will
follow a computational or objective procedure. Developing tasks for the
less analyzable tasks is difficult, and experience drives the operation [Ref.
33:pp. 563-5641. Figure 5 illustrates the relationships between task
variety and analyzability and the appropriate technology and informa-
tion-processing requirements. [Ref. 35:p. 31
Different types of information processing are appropriate for the
different states of technology. For the routine technology of cell 1 in Fig-
ure 5, reports with quantitative data are the primary sources of informa-
tion exchange. In craft technology (cell 2), more information is needed
and face-to-face meetings are more common. Uncertainty increases as
cell numbers increase, reaching the highest degree in cell 4, non-routine
technology. Uncertainty abou* the technology is high, requiring more
interaction within the organization. [Ref. 35:p. 31
2. Inter-Unit Dependence
Inter-unit dependence (discussed in part in task interdepen-
dence) is the amount a subunit is dependent on other subunits for task
accomplishment. Uncertainty increases with increasing interdependence
between groups in an organization. Greater uncertainty creates a greater
need for better information flow and communication. The effect of inter-
unit relations on information processing requirements is shown in Fig-



























As shown in Figure 6, information-processing needs increase
with interdependence, culminating in a reciprocal structure for an orga-
nization. Information-processing requirements are at a minimum in a
pooled structure in which each subunit inputs directly into a central
location. Information-processing demand increases in a sequential struc-
ture as more exchanges between subunits are needed. The sequential
structure requires a serial flow of information. In reciprocal structures, it
is necessary for subunits to exchange information to complete tasks. A
subunit cannot start its task until another subunit completes a prereq-
uisite task, placing a high requirement on effective information flow. [Ref.
35:p. 5]
3. Environmental Uncertainty
The uncertainty in the environment is a major influence on
organizational information processing. One major factor which contrib-
utes to the environment's effect on an organization is the environmental
complexity. If the relationship between what happened in an event and
what caused the event to happen is subject to multiple interpretations,
the need for information processing is high. The second environmental
factor which influences organization information processing is the
amount of change in the environment. A dynamic environment will cause
more uncertainty, whereas a static environment can be very predictable
and certain. Figure 7 represents the relationships of the environmental
characteristics and the influence on information processing. [Ref. 35:p. 4]
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Figure 7. Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Information-processing requirements in an organization increase
as the uncertainty in the environment increases. A static, simple envi-
ronment causes few information-processing requirements. Uncertainty
will increase in a dynamic, complex environment, demanding more infor-
mation processing. [Ref. 35:p. 41
The situational factors of technology, inter-unit dependence,
and environment have a combined effect on uncertainty in an organiza-
tion. This combined uncertainty creates the amount of information pro-
cessing required. The requirements compared against the organizational
capabilities can form a model of information processing.
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E. INFORMATION-PROCESSING MODEL
The effectiveness of an organization can be examined in an informa-
tion-processing model in Figure 8. [Ref. 35:p. 81 On the left-hand side of
Figure 8, the three situational frameworks are combined to show the
information-processing requirements of an organization. On the right-
hand side of the figure, the integrating mechanisms and the unit struc-
ture are combined to show what the organization can process. When the
requirements are compared to the capabilities, the amount of difference
between them is indicative of the effectiveness of the organization. A
match between requirements and capabilities means the organization is
properly designed for its mission.
The information-processing model is commonly applied to civilian
organizations [Ref. 33:pp. 567-5681. This model can easily be used to
design an appropriate structure for a military organization. Evaluating
current organizations and their procedures against the model will provide








VI. SITUATION ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
The estimate of the situation is a procedure staffs use to develop a
plan with available information. Information is processed by staff
members to plan a response to their environment. As the information-
processing capabilities of the staff approach a match of the information-
processing requirements, the effectiveness of the staff can increase.
A. INFORMATION-PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS
The information-processing requirements of a staff include the fol-
lowing: the mission, facts about the environment, friendly and enemy
situation, assumptions about the environment and the friendly and
enemy situation, and development and analysis of possible courses of
action [Ref. 9 :p. 1-41. The amount of uncertainty in each of the require-
ments can vary depending on the particular situation. An effective staff
will thoroughly process information for each of the requirements.
1. Mission
The mission of a unit is either assigned or determined from cur-
rent operations [Ref. 9:p. 2-11. In either case, mission analysis is done by
the staff. Each staff section determines the tasks which must be com-
pleted and the assets available for use in a response. Once the staff




The facts of the current situation are used to develop a plan.
The various staff sections gather information appropriate to their func-
tional area. The information can fall into any of the categories listed in
Table 2. [Ref. 9 :p. 3-11
TABLE 2
FACTS FOR ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
* Terrain/Weather
" Known Enemy Information
* Time
* Status of Own Forces/Known Friendly Information
The intelligence staff prepares information about terrain,
weather, and known enemy information. Known information is data col-
lected and determined to be correct. All the staff sections input informa-
tion about time required and current friendly forces. The facts are assem-
bled in the proper section of each different staff section's estimates. [Ref.
9:p. 3-11
3. Assumptions
For information which is needed but not available, assumptions
are made. Assumptions may also be made to account for facts that can
change based on the time between mission preparation and execution.
Assumptions come from the categories listed in Table 3. [Ref. 9:p. 3-31
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TABLE 3
ASSUMPTIONS FOR ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
" Terrain/Weather
* Enemy Forces (Templating)
" Enemy Courses of Action
" Friendly Unit Status
" Time
The intelligence section plays the primary role in developing
assumptions. The assumptions regarding terrain, weather, enemy forces,
and courses of action are the responsibility of the intelligence staff. As
with the facts, friendly unit status and time required is input from each
staff section. [Ref. 9:p. 3-31
'. Develcpment of Courses of Action
Once all the facts are assembled and necessary assumptions
made, the development of courses of action begins. As taught at the
Army Command and General Staff School (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas).
several feasible courses of action are developed for each possible enemy
course of action [Ref. 9:p. 3-5]. However, as discussed in Chapter II, the
requirement for multiple courses of action is frequently ignored. The
steps taken to develop a course of action are shown in Table 4. [Ref. 9:p.
3-51
The development of courses of action is primarily the responJi-




* Analyze Relative Combat Power
* Array Initial Forces
* Develop the Scheme of Maneuver
* Determine Command and Control Means and
Maneuver Control Measures
" Prepare Course-of-Action Statements ai d Sketches
the other sections are used. The operations staff conducts a comparison
of friendly and enemy force strengths and weaknesses. By comparing the
forces, the operations staff can then develop feasible courses of action.
The staff makes a tentative plan with sketches and mission statements
for each course of action. The tentative plans are then analyzed and the
best course of action for the given mission and resources is Qetermined.
[Ref. 9:p. 3-5]
5. Analysis of Courses of Action
The courses of action that the staff has developed are analyzed
to determine which is the best for the commander to use in accomplish-
ing the mission. Different methods can be used to conduct the analysis,
just as different mental strategies can be used by an individual decision
maker to make decisions. The most accepted method to use when analyz-
ing each course of action is war-gaming.




ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION
* War-Game Courses of Action
" Compare War Game Results
" Develop Branches /Sequels for Each Course of Action
War-gaming is similar to the cognitive strategy of mental simu-
lation (discussed in Chapter III). In war-gaming, the known and assumed
information gathered by the staff is used to prepare a possible scenario.
The possible outcome for each course of action is then determined by
stepping through the likely events. The course of action producing the
most favorable outcome is chosen and the corresponding plan
implemented.
When conducting the estimate of the situation, the staff uses
decision-making strategies to develop the best plan based on known or
assumed information. The information-processing requirements for en
estimate are determined by the uncertainty of a situation. Uncertainty is
the basis for the situational frameworks.
B. INFORMATION-PROCESSING FRAMEWORKS
The information needed by the staff can be compared with the
information-processing frameworks developed in Chapter V. Each of the
situational factors (technology, inter-unit dependence, and the environ-
ment) may vary from one circumstance to another. Many situations may
not fit exactly into in any one category, having attributes from each block
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of a framework. The common trends for situations are useful as a basis
from which to examine the required information.
1. Technology
The technology used by a staff has traits of each of the four
blocks in the technology framework shown in Figure 5. In examining the
technology used, it is important to focus on the functions of the staff
rather than the unit as a whole. The staffs tasks have a large amount of
variety, considering the many different types of combat operations they
may face. Specific tasks of individual staff officers (e.g., determining the
number of personnel) are easily analyzed but the general tasks of the
staff are not. Analyzing the proper development of a course of action is
not a simple matter. The steps are listed above, but developing the out-
put for each step takes skill and experience. The tendency in the staff
estimate is for technology to remain in block 4 of Figure 5 and produce a
need for a high level of information processing.
If technology is in the non-routine block, certain methods of
information processing work better than others. The information will be
quaiitative instead of quantitative. Face-to-face exchanges are a prime
means of information transfer. An example of a face-to-face exchange is a
commander meeting with his staff to develop and then analyze courses of
action.
In situations where the task variety is reduced, other methods
of processing information may work effectively. Task variety is the fre-
quency of unexpected events. Task variety can be reduced by the experi-
ence or skill of the decision maker. If events are expected because of
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experience or foresight, variety is reduced. With a lower level of task vari-
ety, information processing moves toward block 2 of Figure 5. craft tech-
nology. Craft technology also calls for more qualitative information and
relies on past work experience to solve problems. A low-task-variety situ-
ation is one in which recognitional decision making (discussed in Chap-
ter III) is very applicable.
2. Inter-Unit Dependence
The inter-unit dependence of the staff is frequently in the recip-
rocal form shown in block 4 of Figure 6. The output of each staff section
is input into another staff section's estimate. Reciprocal dependence cre-
ates a need for a high amount of information processing.
A highly trained staff can reduce information processing
requirements arising from inter-unit dependence. A sequential form of
dependence can be developed if each member of the staff completes his
or her part of the estimate in a specified order and time. Training to
sequence the order can reduce information-processing requirements and
increase effectiveness.
3. Environment
The environmental cell position will vary with the situation. The
complexity of the environment can vary from simple to complex, and the
degree of change can vary from static to dynamic. In an area with a fluc-
tuating political situation, environmental change is dynamic. In this situ-
ation, the environment will probably be complex. As events approach
high uncertainty in block 4 of Figure 7, more information processing is
needed. To develop a plan in an uncertain environment, the use of the
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estimate of the situation procedure (analyzing multiple courses of action
for each potential enemy action) may produce more effective results than
a recognitional approach.
An environment may be very static and simple, making
information-processing requirements relatively few. The experience of the
commander and staff play a large role in deciding a course of action.
Recognitional decision making may work well in a static, simple
environment.
The various situational factors drive the number of require-
ments for information processing. Fewer requirements may allow a
decision-making strategy which calls for a less-structured process. A
greater amount of information-processing requirements necs a more
attentive course-of-action development and analysis. The ability of the
staff to process the needed information determines the effectiveness of
the staff, regardless of which method is used.
C. INFORMATION-PROCESSNG CAPABILITIES
The information-processing capabilities of a staff will vary according
to individual personalities. Individuals are members of a staff, and their
abilities contribute to the effectiveness of the whole staff. The integrating
mechanisms and the unit structure are what allow the individuals to
interact successfully.
1. Unit Structure
The unit structure changes with different personalities and
passibly with different situations. A staff which is more mechanistic in
structure (shown in Figure 3) has less information-processing capability.
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If the environment is very dynamic and complex, a mechanistic-
structured staff may be forced to change more toward an organic struc-
ture. Changing the structure to organic allows more information to be
processed.
2. Integrating Mechanisms
The integrating mechanisms of a staff are a component of the
information-processing capabilities. A staff that operates simply using a
set of rules or SOPs may have difficulty dealing with new problems
because there may be no prescribed solution. A staff with the capability
to handle feedback can learn and improve with new inputs. The greater
the ability to use liaisons and feedback mechanisms, the greater is the
staffs information-processing capability.
D. INFORMATION-PROCESSING FIT
The approach to information processing should fit the current situa-
tion. As depicted in Figure 8 in Chapter V, the three situational factors
range from cell 1 to cell 4. If the situation fits in cell 1 (the northwest
corner), the recognitional decision making method may fit best. If the
situation fits in cell 4 (southeast corner), a more exacting procedure
(such as the estimate of the situation) may improve effectiveness. Situa-
tions between the two extremes may need a hybrid method consisting of
both the recognitional method and the estimate of the situation.
1. Northwest Corner
In the northwest corners (cells 1) of the situation frameworks.
the three situational factors are in a position to require a small amount
of information processing. The environment is in a simple, certain state.
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creating little uncertainty. The inter-unit dependence approaches a
pooled condition. Although staffs will likely remain in a sequential inter-
unit dependence, the closer the inter-unit dependence is to the northwest
corner, the lesser the amount of uncertainty present. In terms of tech-
nology, a low level of task variety and analyzability will have limited
uncertainty. The low level of uncertainty in each of the factors will
require little information processing.
A low level of it quired information processing will match a fit of
a mechanistic unit structure and a simple inter-unit integrating mecha-
nism in the northwest corner of the capabilities framework. The charac-
teristics of recognitional decision making also fit into the northwest
corner of the information-processing capabilities. A low level of informa-
tion processing is needed because the staff and decision maker can rec-
ognize the situation and react.
The recognitional approach will likely fail if the situational fac-
tors all tend to the southeast corners of their frameworks.
2. Southeast Corner
In the southeast corner (cell 4) of each situational framework, a
high level of information processing is needed to create a fit for the situa-
tional factors. A dynamic, complex environment has a great amount of
uncertainty. A reciprocal inter-unit dependence creates a high level of
internal uncertainty. A tendency to high task variety and unanalyzability
causes much uncertainty. If all three situation factors are in the south-
east corner, a high level of information processing is needed to eliminate
the high level of uncertainty.
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Better results can be achieved with a high level of uncertainty in
situational factors, if a multiple course of action development and analy-
sis is conducted. An organic structure and complex integrating mecha-
nisms provide a staff with more information-processing capabilities.
When followed, the estimate process forces a staff to consciously use
more information than does the recognitional approach.
Many situations cause the situational factors to fall between the
two extremes of the northwest corner and the southeast corner. The
decision-making method may include portions from both the estimate of
the situation and the recognitional approach. The abbreviated command
estimate using the critical factors discussed in Chapter II may prove use-
ful. An important determinant for the appropriate decision-making
method is locating where the staff is positioned in relation to the situa-
tional factors.
3. Recognizing Situation Location
A staff can change its operating structure if the locations of the
situation factors in their frameworks is recognized. Recognizing in what
location each factor is may or may not be feasible. An inexperienced staff
will likely need higher amounts of information because the environment
appears dynamic and complex. Experience in a staff may allow a reduc-
tion of uncertainty and permit a staff to move to a recognitional
approach. Determining when a move to recognitional decision is appro-
priate deserves careful consideration.
In summary, the information-processing framework can be
described as a series of if-then statements. For example, if technology is
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routine, and if inter-unit dependence approaches a pooled state, and if
the perceived environmental uncertainty is low, then information-
processing capabilities must be low to match (possibly recognition deci-
sion making). Alternatively, if technology is non-routine, and if inter-unit
dependence is reciprocal, and if the perceived environmental uncertainty
is high, then information-processing capabilities must be high to create a
match (possibly estimate-of-the-situation format). All of the various com-
binations of situational factors can be mapped to appropriate informa-
tion-processing capabilities states.
Fitting the decision-making process to the situation can
produce a more effective output. The concept may be simple, but
determining the position of all the situational factors may prove difficult.
Any effort to evaluate the effectiveness of a staff should consider the
fit of information-processing capabilities to information-processing
requirements.
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VII. EVALUATION OF DECISION MAKING
Evaluations of decision making take into consideration what makes
effective staffs. Before establishing a method to evaluate a staff, effective-
ness criteria are needed to form a common standard. The degree to which
the goals or mission of a staiff are achieved provides a measure of both
unit and staff effectiveness. However, if effectiveness is based only on
outcomes, there is a possibility that poor staff work can still produce
good outcomes.
Outcome evaluation will not provide the needed evaluation of the
staff process itself. To evaluate how effective a staff is, one must over-
come the problem of quantifying qualitative skills. Skills such as develop-
ing courses of action are not easily evaluated in quantitative terms. The
context or situation in which the staff operates is also difficult to quan-
tify. Measures of performance needed for a staff evaluation are included
in the Army Command and Control Evaluation System (ACCES).
A. ACCES
ACCES was developed by the Army Research Institute to evaluate
Army division and corps headquarters. ACCES is a tailored version of the
Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool (HEAT). HEAT was devel-
oped by Alphatech Inc. under contract to the Defense Communication
Agency. [Ref. 36:p. 81
ACCES measures overall effectiveness and provides diagnostic
scores for how well each process of the staff is performed. The processes
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include monitoring, understanding the situation, estimating the situa-
tion, planning, coordinating, and the network configuration. Measures of
performance, called part-task measures, capture the efforts of the staff
for the processes. [Ref. 37:pp. 5-71
An example of a part-task measure is "understanding quality."
"Understanding quality" is defined as the number of situation percep-
tions held by a staff section- in effect the quality of understanding the
situation. "Understanding quality" is scored as percentage correct, not
incorrect, or incorrect. The measure of performance for the part-task is
scored by periodically comparing the situation as perceived by the staff
with the actual situation during an exercise. A list of part-task measures
Is shown in Table 6. [Ref. 37:p. 61
By using part-task measures, specific problems with a staff are iden-
tified. The individual strengths and weaknesses of the staff are not lost in
a consolidated assessment of unit headquarters' performance. ACCES
considers specific tasks. To understand organizational performance in a
situational perspective, the competing-values approach is used.
B. COMPETING VALUES
The competing-values approach to organizational effectiveness com-
bines different values into a single model. Diverse Indicators of perfor-
mance are used by managers and researchers. The different "values" of
the competing-values approach combine the diverse indicators to form a
single model of effectiveness [Ref. 32:p. 106]. These values are further





Understanding Quality The number of perceptions of the situationheld by the staff section, scored as percentage
correct. not incorrect, or incorrect.
Options The number of alternative courses of action
considered for the future most likely to occur.
Planners The number of staff members participating in
the development of alternative courses of
action.
Queries Required Was additional (or more complete, timely, or
accurate) data required to complete the plan-
ning process?
Queries Accomplished Was additional (or more complete, timely, or
accurate) data requested?
Plan Time Less Than Was the plan time less than the understand-
Understanding Time ing time?
Plan Time: Median time from the making of
an estimate to the end of the time covered
by the associated predictions of the
intended futures.
Understanding Time: Median time from the
expression of an understanding to the end
of the period which the understanding
covers.
Option Rejection Was the recommended course of action
Commander rejected by the commander?
Option Rejection Other Was the recommended course of action
rejected by other than the commander?
Lead Time Adequacy Was the planning lead time provided to sub-
ordinates adequate? Adequacy of lead time




The empirical perspective stresses the importance of facts in a
decision-making process. Emphasis is on gathering all relevant informa-
tion and creating a database. This perspective stresses the need for an
accountable decision-making process which is thoroughly documented.
[Ref. 38:p. 2601
2. Rational Perspective
The rational perspective maintains that logic is of prime impor-
tance in decision making. The decision-making process should directly
flow from the objectives or goals of the organization. Decision-making
methods should emphasize support of improving productivity. [Ref. 38:p.
2601
3. Political Perspective
The political perspective considers the power resources obtained
with a decision. The important factors in a decision are not the results
but rather what is achieved with the results. Decision making should be
flexible and adaptable to insure decisions are accepted as legitimate by
external parties. [Ref. 38:pp. 260-2611
4. Consensual Perspective
The consensual perspective recognizes as important the indi-
vidual feelings and opinions of the individuals in a decision-making
team. The best decision comes from the collective views of the members
of the group. The internal support for the decision is expected to be high.
[Ref. 38:p. 2611
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5. Framework for Competing Values
A framework for the competing values approach to decision
making is shown in Figure 9 [Ref. 38:p. 262]. The perspectives each have
two criteria for evaluating decision processes. Each criterion is important
in a decision-making process, but personal values and situations will





Participatory Process Adaptaole Process
Supportability of Decision Legitimacy of Decision
Internal ExternalConcerns Concerns
Data-Based Process Goal-Centered Process





Figure 9. Framework for the Competing-Values Approach
to Decision-Making Effectiveness
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perspectives (right side) focus primarily on external concerns, with more
emphasis on effect and speed and less emphasis on information. The
consensual and empirical perspectives (left side) focus more on internal
factors, which are concerned more with information use and the appro-
priateness of the decision-making method. The consensual and political
perspectives (top half) favor flexible, intuitive, and implicit decision strat-
egies. The empirical and rational perspectives (bottom half) favor
regulated, analytical, and explicit decision making. [Ref. 38:p. 262]
Values are not the only factors in choosing a perspective. Time
and uncertainty also cuntribu'te to perspective selection. Time-pressured
situations will probably emphasize rational and political (right side)
approaches. Flexibility and efficiency are stressed under time con-
straints. Situations without a time pressure can allow more concern for
the participation and accountability found in the consensual and empiri-
cal perspectives. Situations with high uncertainty are mu.e likely to
de-emphasize the regulated, analytical methods and associate with the
political and consensual perspectives (top half). The empirical and
rational perspectives may be more applicable to situations with certainty.
[Ref. 38:p. 262]
In the competing-values approach to evaluating decision mak-
ing, different criteria are used to evaluate different environments. Values,
time constraints, and uncertainty should all be considered in establish-
ing an evaluation technique. The competing-values approach, combined
with 9 method such as ACCES, may be useful in evaluating military
staffs working in different situations.
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C. EVALUATION OF SITUATION ESTIMATION
The evaluation of situation estimation should consider situational
factors in addition to specific performance of a staff when completing a
task. A staff with limited available time may not produce as thorough an
estimate as a staff with unlimited time. Also, a situation with a high
degree of uncertainty may call for the use of decision processes different
from those used in a more certain environment.
1. Time
According to the competing-values framework, a time-intensive
situation leads to the staff placing emphasis on the political and rational
perspective in its decision processes [Ref. 38:p. 262]. If a staff follows one
of these approaches, it are expected to base decisions on an adaptable
process, decisicn legitimacy, unit goals, and decision efficiency. In other
words, the plans should stress the following factors: (1) flexibility, (2) mil-
itary doctrine, (3) commander's intent, and (4) simplicity. An evaluation
of an unit with a time-pressured situation should concentrate on the four
factors listed above. An evaluation technique (such as ACCES) could be
tailored for an evaluation based on the time factor.
A situation without time pressure would more likely call for a
group to use the consensual and empirical approaches. A data-based
process, decision accountability, decision supportability, and a participa-
tory process are the emphasized criteria [Ref. 38:p. 2621. In terms of
actions a military staff would take in its decision-making process, the cri-
teria include: (1) considering all available Information (possibly seeking
more information), (2) establishing a logical decision method, and (3)
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thoroughly rehearsing plans with (4) all units involv.d. The rehearsals
may vary from a simulation to an actual walk-through on the ground.
The rehearsal would help validate the plan. An evaluation of a staff with
no time constraints could be designed to emphasize the values of the
consensual and empirical perspective.
The amount of time which is considered critical may depend on
the level of the staff and its experience. Given the same amount of time
from conception to execution of a mission, a staff nearer to the operating
force may need less time than a higher-level staff. The higher-level staff
has more units through which it must pass orders and it therefore con-
sumes time in the process. A more experienced staff may be able to com-
plete the same task more quickly than an inexperienced staff. The critical
amount of time deserves special attention.
2. Uncertainty in the Environment
A highly uncertain environment may lead to an emphasis of the
political and consensual perspectives in a group's decision-making pro-
cess. Decision supportability, a participatory process, an adaptable pro-
cess, and decision legitimacy are the criteria chosen [Ref. 38 :p. 262]. The
criteria in military terms are: (1) thorough rehearsals with (2) all units
involved, (3) flexibility, and (4) adherence to military doctrine. An evalua-
tion of a staff in an uncertain environment should concentrate on the
criteria of the political and consensual perspectives.
A staff with a more-certain environment is more likely to use the
empirical and rational perspectives in their decision-making process. The
critical criteria are: a data-based process, decision accountability, unit
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goals, and decision efficiency [Ref. 38:p. 2621. In military terms, the cri-
teria include: (1) evaluating all available information, (2) strictly following
the estimate-of-the-situation process, and emphasizing (3) commander's
intent and (4) simplicity. The procedure used to evaluate a staff in a cer-
tain environment shoald consider the empirical and rational perspec-
tives' criteria.
The level of uncertainty may be as difficult to determine as the
amount of time which is critical. Experienced staffs may recognize etfec-
tive decisions using little information because events are familiar to
them. An evaluation of an experienced staff should measure uncertainty
levels differently than an evaluation of a new staff. Measuring or quanti-
fying uncertainty may prove difficult.
Evluating a staffs estimate of the situation deserves thorough
consideration. The environment and the staffs experience level can influ-
ence effectiveness. If the goal of the evaluation is to train staffs to become
more effective, it is this author's opinion that the evaluation musc con-




Many factors contribute to effective situation assessment. Individual,
group, and organizational decision making all play key roles in the
decision-making process. The environment or situation in which an orga-
nization operates is also crucial to its decision-making process.
Individuals use various processes or strategies to make decisions.
Recognitional decision making is one strategy used effectively by individ-
uals. Other processes include mental simulation and analyzing problem-
specific information. Analyzing problem-specific information is the
technique used by military staffs in the estimate of the situation.
Groups can make decisions in a military organization The comman-
der's staff is such a group, and the staff has subgroups in its various
sections. Groups can improve the process or impede effective decision
making. The design of the group and the role of the group in an organiza-
tion define the group's effectiveness.
Organizations can be described as information-processing systems.
An organization will encounter uncertainty while making decisions. To
help overcome uncertainty, an organization processes information about
situatioral factors. Matching the unit structure and integrating mecha-
nisms with the amount of uncertainty creates a fit which should increase
effectiveness.
Situation estimation includes determining what the current situa-
tion is and deciding what response will achieve organizational goals.
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Establishing the state of an organization calls for examining the factors
of the situation. Situational factors with a high level of uncertainty
require a high level of information-processing capability to maximize unit
effectiveness.
The perceived environment, technology, and inter-unit dependence
are the situational factors used to define the state of the situation. Differ-
ent decision-making strategies are appropriate, depending on the state of
the situation. A recognitional decision-making strategy may be most
applicable when the situaticnal factors teCnd to have a large amount of
associated certainty. A more exacting procedure (such as the estimate of
the situation) is most appropriate in a -highly uncertain situation. A situ-
ation with an amount of uncertainty between the two extremes may call
for an abbreviated estimate of the situation or a compromise between
recognitional decision making and a complete estimate of the situation.
Information-processing capabilities include unit structure and inte-
grating mechanisms. A unit structure can vary from mechanistic to
organic. The mechanistic (or more rigid) structure has less information-
processing capability than the organic. An organic structure allows more
participation from members and thus has an increased information-
processing capability. The unit integrating mechanisms vary from a sim-
plistic standardization to the more complex feedback procedure. The
feedback procedure involves more information processing.
The effectiveness of an organization can be determined by comparing
its information-processing requirements and the information-processing
capabilities. A match between requirements and capabilities implies the
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organization is effective. As the requirements change, the organization
must change its capabilities to met the new requirements.
An evaluation of situation assessment should consider the situa-
tional factors in which a unit operates. A unit with a time-constrained
situation is not operating under the same conditions as a unit without
time constraints. Different results from the two units are understand-
able. Similarly, the level of uncertainty varies the perspective of the unit.
A unit operating in a highly uncertain environment should assess the sit-
uation differentiy than when operating a certain environment. Adjusting
the evaluation to the situational factors can provide a moie accurate
assessment of the effectiveness of a staff. With the more accurate assess-
ment, the staff can focus its training on overcoming the specific problems
that have reduced its effectiveness.
The issues concerning situation estimation are not nearly resolved.
Issues other than those addressed in this paper should be investigated in
order to better understand of the estimate-of-the-situation proe's A
major concern is how to recognize the state of the situational factors. For
example, at what perceived environmental uncertainty level is recogni-
tional decision making appropriate? If a unit can readily determine the
state of each situational factor. it can more readily adjust the unit struc-
ture and integrating mechanisms to compensate for the situational factor
states.
A need exists for a headquarters evaluation which includes situa-
tional factors. A situational perspective on a staffs effort allows a better
description of the staffs abilities. An accurate assessment of the staffs
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abilities will help identify adjustments needed to improve the staffs
effectiveness.
Improving performance and capabilities is a goal common in military
units. Improving the ability of the staffs that make decisions about how
to fight can result in a major improvement in military performance and
capability. Studying the decision-making processes can. lead to an
increase in a military staff s effectiveness and, by extension, increase the
effectiveness of the military.
88
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Clausewitz, C., On War, ed. by Anatol Rapoport, Penguin Books,
1968.
2. Fallesen, J. J., Memorandum Subject: Problems in Command and
Control, The Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences 1 May 1989.
3. Booth, J. E.: Debien, P. T.: and Bensten, C. E., Analysis of Naval
Tactical Decision Making: The Vagabond Approach, Master's Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 1982.
4. Headquarters, U.S. Army, Staff Organization and Operations,
FM 101-5, May 1984.
5. Headquarters, U.S. Army, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Bat-
talion Task Force, FM 71-2J, coordinating draft, Washington, D.C.,
December 1984.
6. Alphatech, Inc., Experiment II Report: The Effects of Option Plan-
ning and Battle Workload on Command and Control, by E. E. Entin,
A. Needalman, D. Mikaelian, and R. Tenney, October 1988.
7. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, A Guide to the
Application of the Estimate of the Situation in Combat Operations,
FC 100-9, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, April 1984.
8. Shirron, W. E., An Optimum Method of Wargaming a Tactical and
Operational Course of Action as an Integral Part of a Corps Com-
mander's and G3's Estimate of the Situation in a Time Compressed
Environment, Master's Thesis, School of Advanced Military Stud-
ies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 1984.
9. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, The Command Esti-
mate, ST 100-9, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January 1989.
10. Vermillion, J. M., Tactical Implications of the Adoption of Auftrags-
taktik for Command and Control on the Airland Battlefield, School
of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Decem-
ber 1985.
11. Air Force Human Resources Laboratory Report TP-94-2 1. Thctical
n=7i-,z u-Making Studies: Research Plan, uy G. FreKany, Apnl 1985.
89
12. Klein, G., "Strategies of Decision Making," Military Review. v. LXIX
(May 1989), pp. 56-64.
13. RAND Corporation Note N- 1600-AF, Projecting the Future for Situ-
ation Assessment and Planning: A Cognitive Analysis, by B. Hayes-
Roth, November 1980.
14. Engineering Research Associates, Schema Based Model for Infor-
mation Processing for Situation Assessment, by D. F. Noble, C. Grosz,
and D. Boehm-Davis, October 1986.
15. Army Research Institute Research Note 88-42, Structuring Knowl-
edge Retrieval: An Analysis of Decomposed Quantitative Judge-
ments, by D. MacGregor, S. Lichtenstein, and P. Slovic, June
1988.
16. Edwards, W., and Van Winterfield, D., "Cognitive Illusions and
Their Implications for the Law," Southern Cali ornia Law Review,
v. 59 (January 1986), pp. 225-276.
17. Tolcott, M. A.; Marvin, F. F.: and Lehner, P. E., Effects Of Early
Decisions On Later Judgment in an Evolving Situation, Decision
Science Consortium, Inc., July 1987.
18. Tolcott, M. A., and Marvin, F. F., Reducing the Confirmation Bias in
an Evolving Situation, Decision Science Consortium, Inc., August
1988.
19. Army Research Institute Technical Report 806, Effects of Exper-
tise and Cognitive Style on Information Use in Tactical Decision
Making, by R. R. Michel and S. L. Riedel, 1988.
20. Ivancevich, J. M.; Szilagyi, A. D., Jr.; and Wallace, M. J., Jr., Orga-
nizational Behavior and Performance, Goodyear Publishing Com-
pany, 1977.
21. Associates, Office of Military Leadership, United States Military
Academy, ed., A Study of Organizational Leadership, Stackpole
Books, 1976.
22. DeSanctis, G., and Gallupe, R. B., "A Foundation for the Study of
Group Decision Support Systems," Management Science, v. 33
(May 1987), pp. 589-609.
23. Mortagy, B., Crisis Management: An MIS Research Perspectie,
notes from lecture presented at MIS Research Colloquium, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 5 September 1989.
90
24. Associates, The Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leader-
ship, United States Military Academy, Leadership in Organizations,
3rd ed., 1985.
25. Office of Naval Research Report TR-ONR-7, Increasing Productivity
through Social Structure: Final Project Report, by B. Latane,
undated.
26. Klein, G., and Thordsen, M., Recognitional Decision Making In C3
Organizations, paper presented at 1989 Symposium of Command
and Control Research, National Defense University, Ft. Lesley J.
McNair. Washington, D.C., June 27-29, 1989.
27. Hirokawa, R. Y., and Pace, R., "A Descriptive Investigation of the
Possible Communication-Based Reasons for Effective and Ineffec-
tive Group Decision Making," Communication Monographs, v. 50
(December 1983), pp. 363-379.
28. Rathwell, M. A., and Bums, A., "Information Systems Support for
Group Planning and Decision-Making Activities," MIS Quarterly,
v. 9 (September 1985), pp. 255-271.
29. Trueman, R. E., An Introduction to Quantitative Methods for Deci-
sion Making, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1977.
30. Hart, S., and others, "Managing Complexity Through Consensus
Mapping: Technology for the Structuring of Group Decisions,"
Academy of Management Review, v. 10, no. 3 (March 1985),
pp. 587-600.
31. Fischoff, B., "Decision Making in Complex Organizations," NATO
ASI Series, v. f21 (1986), pp. 61-83.
32. Tushman, M. L., and Nadler, D. A., "Information Processing as an
Integrating Concept in Organizational Design," Academy of Man-
agement Review, v. 3 (July 1978), pp. 613-624.
33. Daft, R. L., and Lengel, R. H., 'Organization Information Require-
ments, Media Richness and Structural Design," Management
Science, v. 32 (May 1986), pp. 554-571.
34. Ungson, G. R.; Braunstein, D. N.: and Hall, P. D., "Managerial
Information Processing: A Research Review," Administrative
Science Quarterly, v. 26 (March 1981), pp. 116-133.
35. Triscari, T., Lecture Notes and Suggested References on Organiza-
tion Theory and Design an Information Processing Systems Approach,
91
unpublished lecture notes presented at the Department of Sys-
tems Acquisition Management, School of Systems and Logistics,
Air Fo-ce Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB Ohio, not
dated.
36. Shaw, J. J., Headquarters Effectiveness Tool (briefing charts from
lecture presented at the Naval Postgraduate School). Monterey,
California, 8 September 1989.
37. Army Research Institute draft report, Part-Task Performance Mea-
sures, by Defense Systems, Inc., 28 October 1988.
38. Rohrbaugh, J., Assessing the Effectiveness of Expert Teams, paper
presented at the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Expert





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
3. ARI Field Unit- Leavenworth 1
PO Box 3407 (Dr. Fallesen)
Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027-0347
4. Professor Carl R. Jones, Code 74 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
5. CPT James D. McMullin 2
2195 Crescent Drive
Altadena, CA 91031
6. CPT James Henderson 1
8415 Crown Place
Alexandria, VA 22308
93
